September 21, 2026: The U.S. Marine Corps’ new AAVs (Amphibious Assault Vehicles) will be equipped with Pulsar Lite EW (Electronic Warfare) signal jammers to defeat drone navigation systems. Deliveries of the Pulsar Lite system will begin in a few months. Some are expected to show up in Ukraine next year, if not sooner. Pulsar Lite will join dozens of other jammers and EW systems already used in Ukraine. Pulsar Lite differs in that it weighs only 11 kg and can be used on drones, mounted in vehicles or helicopters, or carried by infantry and placed on the ground, then turned on when needed.

The Marines appreciate that Pulsar can detect and jam drones over three kilometers away. Most of these drones are FPV (first-person view) models that let the operator see where the drone is going. Another surveillance drone records the attack by an FPV drone, which destroys itself along with its Russian target. Because drone operators and their assistants operate from bunkers, they suffer few casualties. This makes it possible for women soldiers to operate drones. Women also serve on the front lines as snipers and medical personnel. Public opinion is hostile to women getting killed in combat, even though many women volunteer for these assignments. About 200 female soldiers have been killed so far. Women currently comprise ten percent of Ukrainian military personnel.

Some drone operators work from civilian vehicles because they must move their drone control equipment to different points on the front line to stay within radio range of their drones. In some sectors of the front, drones inflict 90 percent of the casualties, but overall drones are responsible for about 80 percent of Russian casualties.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are sending in quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers using FPV goggles to see what the drone's day/night camera can see. Most FPV drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so they can instantly turn into flying bombs that fly into a target and detonate. This is an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power than the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed-wing drones are used for long-range operations against targets over a thousand kilometers inside Russia.

A major limitation to expanding drone operations was the need for trained drone operators. These operators need dozens of hours of training before they can operate these drones, and even more hours of actual use before they can make the most of the system.

These small drones can complete their missions most of the time, whether it is a one-way attack or a reconnaissance and surveillance mission. Recon missions are usually survivable, allowing the drone to be reused. These drones constantly perform surveillance, meaning both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, extending at least a few kilometers into enemy territory.

This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, and both sides are producing as many as they can. Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians, or small teams of them, designed and built drones. These drones became candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers drove rapid evolution in drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses. Each month, Ukrainian factories and home workshops build several hundred thousand drones, along with substantial imports from European nations that have begun producing Ukrainian-designed drones.

Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with drones. Not having enough to match the enemy's numbers in a part of the front puts you at a serious disadvantage there. These drones are still evolving in design and use, and they're becoming more effective and essential.

One countermeasure that often works for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signals. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends them back to their takeoff point to land for later use when control signals are jammed. Drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal can attack ground jammers. Countermeasures can be overcome, and the most popular current one is to control a drone via a fiber-optic cable.