Leadership: Russian Centralization Versus Ukrainian Adaptability

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July 24, 2026: The Ukraine War has always been about Russian Centralization Versus Ukrainian Adaptability. For centuries, Russian governments were referred to as the Center. All things good and bad emanated from the capital, Moscow

When confronted by the unexpected Ukrainian-driven drone\UAV revolution, Russia did something different. In mid-2024, they created Rubicon. The full name is Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Rubicon was given access to the best technical, manufacturing, and military assets they needed to develop and produce new drones that could overwhelm Ukrainian drone forces. This included adding AI/Artificial Intelligence capabilities to Russian drones and counter-drone systems.

Rubicon got all the resources it wanted to turn the tide in the drone wars inside Ukraine. Ukrainian forces soon noted that the Russian drones were becoming more capable, as were the Russian electronic warfare operations used to disrupt Ukrainian drones. Rubicon developed technologies and tactics that enabled Russian drone operators to find and destroy more Ukrainian drone controllers. The Ukrainians found that Russian electronic warfare against Ukrainian drones was becoming more effective.

By mid-2025, the Rubicon initiative was turning the tide in the drone wars. At that point, it was up to Ukraine to come up with effective countermeasures in terms of new drones and improved electronic warfare.

Russian drones briefly had the initiative, and it was increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate within 30 kilometers of the front line. As quickly as the Ukrainians moved to upgrade their drone operations, Rubicon found ways to keep Russian forces ahead. That’s because Rubicon was designed to carefully observe changes in Ukrainian equipment and tactics and quickly match and surpass it. The Ukrainians then managed to match and surpass Rubicon to the point where Russian chances of winning the war faded into insignificance and defeat.

And then there was Ukrainian adaptability. When a country is at war, and the situation becomes desperate, speedy innovation is the only way out. Ukraine managed to adapt because its population has a higher proportion of technically adept people than Russia or most Western nations. Ukraine also put most of its drone production operations underground. This includes warehouses for storing drone components, areas for developing new drone technology, and spaces for monitoring current drone use and operations.

Ukraine also uses bottom-up control of drone use. Platoon commanders and members of that platoon are allowed to make drone use decisions on the spot. That includes when and how often to use electronic jamming and other countermeasures. Worse for the Russians is that the Ukrainians are significantly faster at updating and modifying their drone designs and tactics. Whoever is first to use a new technology or tactic tends to prevail.

Russian soldiers still wait for orders before acting. No orders mean nothing happens on the Russian side. This is one reason the Russians are running out of infantry. Russia can barely cover the 900-kilometer front line, and the current number of Russian ground attacks is minuscule.

This is Russia’s own fault. They persisted in making frontal assaults, often with ill-prepared and poorly trained soldiers. It barely worked in World War II, and it was noted then that by 1945 most Russian soldiers were from Central Asian regions. These men were rarely trusted to serve as front-line infantry, but by the end of the war, few Slavic Russians were available. In Ukraine, history has repeated itself.

Ukraine conserved its manpower while accelerating the development and deployment of remotely operated weapons. Ukrainian drone operators and support personnel are kept safely away because they are the key personnel needed to defeat the Russians.

Ukrainian drone operators operate from whatever location is suitable and available. This can be from a civilian car or truck, as well as a bunker or the wreckage of bombed-out buildings. Vehicles are preferred because they can quickly move drone control equipment, jammers, electronic warfare systems, and drone supplies to portions of the front line to stay within radio range of their drones. In some sectors of the front, drones inflict 90 percent of the casualties. Drones are responsible for nearly two-thirds of Russian casualties and equipment losses.

Most of these drones are the FPV/First Person View model that allows the operator to see where the drone is going. Another surveillance drone records the attack by an FPV drone, which destroys itself along with its Russian target. Ukraine constantly adds new models to its drone force. In 2025, Ukraine obtained four million drones. This year, that will nearly double, to seven million drones, including a growing number of land and naval drones.

The drones are considered rounds of ammunition, like a bullet, artillery shell, or hand grenade. Ukraine also received American satellite surveillance and intercepts of Russian electronic communications. That flow of information is sometimes interrupted by American political disputes. The Ukrainians have dealt with that as well, at least for short periods.

Another advantage is the American-based SpaceX Starlink satellite network overhead. Ukrainian forces have Starlink ground terminals, which consist of a small satellite dish, a controller, and a battery. Each of these can be carried in a soldier's backpack and set up anywhere within minutes. Russian troops still lack suitable, reliable radios, and the Russian space satellite networks have deteriorated over the last decade into a barely functioning, unreliable state.

The Russians know that they are in trouble, but their leader, Vladimir Putin, will deny it to the end. With help from their only allies, North Korea and Iran, Russia can still launch an occasional large-scale bombardment with missiles and drones. These usually cause little damage because the Ukrainians detect their approach and have developed a constantly evolving air defense system. When pressed, Russia blames these problems on NATO assistance. The last thing Russia wants to admit is that they are being defeated by Ukrainians.